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FAMILY LAW AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM"
Richard M. Buxbaum

Alexander LUderitz worked with distinction at the intersection of Private International Law and
Family Law, and enriched his work through a profound understanding of Comparative Law. It is both in
friendship and in recognition of his achievements in this important sector that this tribute to his memory is
presented. In substance, the following is a report on the recent 1 refinement and implementation of methods
developed in the United States to transcend, in family law, the impasse created by our well-known aversion
to accepting international conventional obligations in fields that domestically are the province of the
several states.2 The original American scholarship about this subject, from which I borrow, is largely the
creation of other US friends and colleagues of Alexander LUderitz; thus, this is in a way also a family
tribute to him .

Introduction
The title of this paper reflects the broad reach of the work of Alexander LUderitz. The subject
covered, however, is of necessity a more narrow one, one that the classic conflict-of-laws literature tends to
3
relegate to the basement of practical implementation. Maintenance/child support was chosen because

~;~~~~~:;~~ea;::e~!/;~::.Tentation it best embodies the second component of the title. the special
The decision of the Hague Conference on Private International Law to revisit the issue of child
support (maintenance)5 in order to improve both the substance and the implementation of the four relevant
•
My deep thanks to Professor Carol Bruch, University of California, Davis School of Law, for her
careful and critical review of this paper; the remaining shortcomings are mine alone .
I emphasize "recent," because the comprehensive and analytical review of the earlier status of
these matters by MUiler-Freienfels, "Zweistaatliche Unterhaltsprozesse," in FS Gerhard Kegel389 (H.-J.
Musielak & K. Schurig, eds., Stuttgart 1987) remains the definitive study.
Carol Bruch, "International Family Law as the Century Turns," 33 Family Lent· Quarterly 607
( 1999): "For many years the federal government was reluctant to enter into treaty obligations that would
preempt state laws because family law was viewed as the proper subject of state rather than national law."
For an important critical voice against this position/attitude from a leading US conflict-of-laws authority.
see Cavers, "International Enforcement of Family Support." 81 Columbia Law Review 999 ( 1981 ),
especially at I 005ff.
See. e.g., the relatively short shrift given the Hague Conventions' implementation problems in the
most recent substantial treatment of the field, in Martiny, "Maintenance Obligations in the Conflict of
Laws.'' in Vol. 247 Recueil des Cours 131 ( 1994-III). A noteworthy exception, however, is the mentioned
contribution of Mu/ler-Freienfels. supra n. I, especially at 412ff.
It also reflects another family connection. It was our common mentor, colleague. and friend .
Albert A. Ehrenzweig who used his mastery of Private International Law to point out tt> his American
colleagues the interstate problems of excessive judicialization of child support that had not been resolved
by the farst effort at uniform legislation embodied in the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(URESA) of 1950 and variously amended thereafter. See his "The Interstate Child and Uniform
Legislation: A Plea for Extralitigious Proceedings.'' 64 Michigan Law Review I ( 1965); see already also the
description of this problem. among others. in Brockel bank. Interstate Enforcement ofFamily Support (The
Runaway Pappy Act) (1960; 2d ed., with lnfausto. 1971 ).

Permanent Bureau. Hague Conference on Private International Law. "Conclusions of the Special
Commission on Maintenance Obligations of April 1999."' par. 46 (December 1999) ("The Special
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Conventions-- Hague 1956, 6 New York [UN] 1956, Hague 1958,S and Hague 1973, 9 will provide an
interesting test for United States participation in this fonn of international cooperation. The influence of
the United States can be discerned in the fonnulation of the 1956 UN Maintenance Convention. 10 especially
in its treatment of jurisdictional issues and of the special ratification problems of the federal state, and the
substantive approach ofthe Hague Conventions (in their recognition of the need for administrative as well
as judicial remedies) parallels even if it does not simply borrow from contemporaneous US debates on the
subject. Nevertheless. the UN Convention was more an invitation to the US to reconsider its historic
posture than a signal of the latter's willingness to do so. 11 That tum to more direct involvement originally
was signalled with the US decision to join the Hague Conference (and UNIDROIT) in 1964, and has been
confinned with its participation not only in the negotiation of the one Convention (on international child
abduction) the US has ratified but also in its work on more recent ones that the Hague Conference has
produced on related subjects and that are in various stages of consideration and implementation.
The involvement ofthe United States in the important subsectorofFamily Maintenance/Child
Support international cooperation, however, at least to date has moved in a different direction . The support
problem unique to the United States comes from its federal not its international relations. The adoption by
the majority of states of the original Unifonn Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act [URESA] 12 already
some decades ago reflected the reality that the overwhelming majority of support problems was the result
of the interstate mobility of the non-custodial spouse, compared with which the problems of international
mobility faded into the background. While recognition of the latter problem, and efforts to enforce its
consequences at the intra-US level, have been on the agenda for haifa century by now, 13 and while indeed
Commission .. . recommends that the Hague Conference should commence work on the elaboration of a new
worldwide international instrument."] . This Conclusion is largely based on a survey of national authorities
and on the thorough report ofthe First Secretary of the Conference: see Duncan. "Maintenance Obligations
-Note on the desirability of revising the Hague Conventions on Maintenance Obligations and including in
a new instrument rules on judicial and administrative co-operation." Pre I. Doc. No 2. January 1999
(available in French and English from the Pennanent Bureau and at www .hcch.net) .
6

Convention on the Law Applicable to Obligations to Support Minor Children [ 1956 Hague
Convention], 510 U .N.T .S. 161, reprinted in 5 American Journal ofComparative Law 656 (1956) .
United Nations Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance. 268 U.N .T.S. 3.
Convention Concerning the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Involving Obligations to
Support Minor Children [ 1958 Hague Convention], 539 U.N.T.S. 27. reprinted in 5 American Journal of
Comparative Law 658 ( 1956) (the reprinted text being identical with that later in fact adopted).
9

Actually two Conventions: The Hague Convention of October 2, 1973 on the Law Applicable to
Maintenance Obligations. 1021 U.N.T.S. 209 (1976) and the Hague Convention ofOctober 2, 1973 on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance Obligations, 1056 U.N .T.S. 199
( 1977), reprinted in 21 American Journal ofComparati\·e Law 156 ( 1973 ).
10

Supra n. 7.

11

See the full discussion of this point in Mziller-Freienfels, supra n. at 409ff. On the general issue
of US participation, see the overview by Nadelmann. "The United States and the Hague Conferences on
Private International Law," I American Journal of Comparative Lmv 268 ( 1952) and same, "The United
States Joins the Hague Conference on Private International Law," 30 Law & Contemporary Problems 291
(1965). the latter reprinted in same, Conflict ofLm1•s: International and Interstate 99 (1972).
12

9A Uniform Laws Annotated ( 1968).vo19. pt I 8 p 235 1999 98 mastered

13

The original Act [URESA] was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on

Unifonn State Laws in 1950. was variously amended thereafter. and was the subject of a major revision in
1968 [RURESA]. See the review of this period (Editorial Text], 9 Part lB. Cniform Laws Annotated 235
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the 1968 revision of the Uniform Law did tum out to be useful in the international context, 14 it is a more
recent legislative reform that has re-energized the effort to consider international enforcement as well.
That reform comprises both federal and (uniform) state law. It touches on procedural, substantive,
and choice-of-law issues that may have an impact on future efforts at international cooperation. That
cooperation by the US with its foreign counterparts in the past was based on what might be called an extraConventional regime; the US, however, probably will participate in the negotiations for a new
Conventional regime now being planned. As a result, the recent US federal and state reforms not only will
need to be reviewed by the foreign partners in both types of regimes, but may bear on the choice of regime
in the future . The purpose of the present paper is, first, to recall the origin, constraints, and function of the
extra-Conventional, "bottom-up" forms of transnational cooperation that the individual US States had
devised over the past several decades; second, to introduce the possible impacts on these forms of
transnational cooperation that the welfare-reform legislation of the 1990s has created; and, third, to
speculate on the possible future forms of that cooperation that might develop within the same channels or
be diverted into the mainstream of a revised Hague Convention on Maintenance enjoying US participation.
II

Context
I.

The Reciprocity Issue: Phase One

While the original Uniform Act dates back to 1950, its major 1968 revision, that produced
RURESA, provides the best starting point for this discussion. As DeHart, on whose article most of the
following history is based, has explained, 15 that Act encouraged bilateral efforts that would work for both
outbound and inbound support-order enforcement requests. Because the Act defined the responding state
(the state in which the non-supporting spouse resided) to include a foreign nation, a US state agency at least
could ask the foreign state to accept and under its domestic civil procedure enforce 16 the initiating
jurisdiction's support order. In practice, given immigration and migration trends, this turned out to be of
benefit primarily in the reverse situation, providing that. in RURESA 's terms, the foreign state was a
jurisdiction ·'in which ... a substantially similar reciprocal law is in effect." 17 Given this rather informal
situation, and given the precedent of an earlier arrangement entered into in 1960 between the State of
Michigan and the Province of Ontario, Canada under the original URESA. an official unit of the NCCUSL.
the National Conference on Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support, began the negotiation of
international arrangement by individual States. The first such arrangement was concluded between
California and the United Kingdom in 1972 (the latter's ability to consider such arrangements having been
established in that year thanks to the passage of the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of
1972). Although this official intergovernmental format could no longer be maintained once the NCCUSL
ended its sponsorship of the Support Conference. an unofficial format was developed in the form of a non( 1999). One of these versions had been adopted by every State by the time both were replaced in 1993 b}
the NCCUSL in favor of a new Act. the 1992 version of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
[UIFSA], ibid. See to this history Gloria Folger DeHart, "Comity, Conventions. and the Constitution:
State and Federal Initiatives in International Support Enforcement,'" 28 Fami~v Law Quarter6· 89. 91
(1994). Barely offthe press. that Law was revised in 1996. largely to conform it to the newly enacted
federal legislation discussed infra in text at n. 28.
14

As, according to Cavers, supra n. 2, did the 1975 revisions contained in the Social Services
Amendments of 1974,42 U.S.C. Sees. 651-662 .
/d. at 93f.
16
I do not discuss the separate problem ofthe modification of a support order by either the initiating
or responding state.

17

RURESA. Section 1(m).

3
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profit entity now known as the National Child Support Enforcement Association (NCSEA). 18 That entity,
which of course was primarily involved in the implementation of interstate support orders, became the
forum through and within which a number of States -led not surprisingly by California- adopted these
arrangements with foreign countries. That process was significantly accelerated thanks to a 1979 British
Order in Council that extended the California-style arrangement to all other States of the Union that had
enacted the appropriate RURESA definition. 19
Among these, that with the Federal Republic of Germany may be of most interest to readers ofthis
20
volume although for reasons given below it may not be the most efficient arrangement. It began with
discussions between California state officials and the Heidelberg lnstitut filr Vormundschaftswesen, soon
joined by state officials from Illinois and Washington, all of whom, it should be recognized, panicipated in
these preliminary negotiations on their own time and at their own expense! 21 That institute, also technically
an NGO (tqough with some Jugendamt support) was the catalyst leading to the first German involvement
in this bilateral system. specifically with California.22 As is well-known in Germany, the practical
awkwardness of fitting German civil procedure to the opportunity afforded by the RURESA structure and
its single-State implementation 23 led the Federal Ministry of Justice to draft and the Federal Parliament to
adopt a statute mirroring these elements ofRURESA, and in fact drafted to be available also to other

18

See DeHart, supra n. 13 , at 95. DeHart. then Deputy Attorney General of California. was
instrumental in this initiative, and has been centrally engaged in both the state-by-state and federal efforts
discussed below. Her engagement has been formall) noted and commended by the then-Depu~ Legal
Adviser of the State Department for Private International Law. Peter Pfund: see same. "The Hague
Intercountry Adoption Convention and Federal International Child Support Enforcement. .. 30 l' C. Davis
LOYo' Review 647. 658f( 1997).
19

DeHart. supra n.l3 at 95.

20

Not that this would be their first meeting of the topic: see in particular the meticulous discussion
by Mii/ler-Freienfe/s, supra n. I.
21

DeHart, supra n. 13 at 96 n. 31. Gloria Folger DeHart. who as mentioned is credited with
initiation of this process. also organized her colleagues from other States to participate. and pushed the
essential concept of frequent meetings ofthe international community of working-level participants. As
she has pointed out. DeHart. id. at I01:
"The State/NCSEA/ABA Family Law Section ·team· returns to many of these countries for
follow up . In addition. and very useful for both the states and the foreign countries involved.
is the attendance of foreign child support officials at the annual NCSEA training conference
where they can meet enforcement officials and attorneys involved in support enforcement
from most of the states .. ,
22

The first arrangement of April 1978 is reviewed. along with the RURESA structure that permitted
its execution, in Rtinzi. "Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland als ein 'reciprocating state' im Verhliltnis zu
Kalifornien." 51 Der A.mtsvormund 421 ( 1978). and its potential suitability as a model for other Federal
Republic-US State arrangements discussed in Dolzer, "Neuregelung der Durchsetzung von
UnterhaltsansprUchen deutscher Kinder in Kalifornien,'' 27 ZgesFamilienrecht 646 ( 1980). A brief
elucidation of its practical implementation is provided by Plillmann. "Nochmals: Zur Durchsetzung von
UnterhaltsansprUchen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland lebender Kinder in Kalifornien," 28/bid. 645
(1981).
23

In particular. according to one commentator, German applicants could not count on a German
court to play the ''initiating-request" role without first going through the process of obtaining a judgment
ordering payment of a support obligations. See thereto Rzin=i. supra n. 22 at 424f.

4
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federal regimes, primarily those ofCanada. The "inefficiency," if it is one. was that German law
apparently required individual certification of each interested US State as one meeting the appropriate
15
standards of reciprocal cooperation. which meant recourse to a variety of more or less formal assurances
from State agencies, understandably a time-consuming process. The well-known "Alphonse and Gaston"
dance of demonstrating mutual reciprocity to each putative dance partner obviously is made all the more
complex when individual federal US States. with little experience in the conduct of foreign relations. come
onto the dance floor with varying notions of the steps·· not to mention the differing understanding of their
prospective partners of those different notions.

2.

The Reciprocity Issue: Phase Two

It is, therefore, not surprising that efforts at more centralized approaches to the crossing of this
first threshold barrier to consideration of foreign maintenance obligations have been proposed or adopted
both in the United States and in other countries. To start with the latter, some countries. for example
Austria and Sweden, simply included all US States that had enacted the Uniform Law in the program at
once. and extended their own reciprocity to that group as a whole. either by special legislative action or b)'
executive orders. 26 France also adopted this approach. but only after receiving the assurance of the US
Department of State that the conclusion of recognition arrangements by the several States of the Union with
a foreign country was within the competence of these States under US constitutional norms .27 This
involvement of the federal authorities (which occurred in 1980. of course with the acquiescence of the state
representatives who had been negotiating the French arrangement) may have had an influence on the next
stage of the reciprocity dance.
That next step was the direct involvement ofthe US Department of State. on behalfofthe several
states, in converting the existing State-foreign country arrangements into federal ones- still. it should be
noted, outside of the framework ofthe Convention. While this involvement had begun earlier. a strong
new impulse for this centralized approach was a provision of the politically high-profile Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 [sic], the principal purpose of which is
"to get people off the welfare rolls ." 28 Section 371 thereof authorizes the Secretary of State. acting in
consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, "to designate as reciprocating countries
9
those countries that are substantially able to meet the ... mandatory requirements for such designation.'':
24

DeHart. supra n. 13 at 97. The referenced statute is the Gesetz zur Geltendmachung von
Unterhaltsansprilchen im Verkehr mit auslandischen Staaten [Auslandsunterhaltsgesetz- AUG] of
December 19. 1986, [ 1986] BGBI 12563. See its detailed review in its draft form in Mockenhaupt. "Zur
Geltendmachung deutscher Kindesunterhaltsurteile und -ansprilche in den Vereinigten Staaten:· 58 Der
Amtsvormund 1 ( 1985) [Another connection: Dr. lnes Mockenhaupt was Alexander Lilderitz's doctoral
student] ; for a succinct review of the procedures it embod ies. see Bohmer. "Das Auslandsunterhaltsgesetz
(AUG) vom 19. 12 . 1986," 7/PRa.t 139 (1987).

2
~
This derives from Section I(3) of the AUG . which characterizes federal states as "states .. in the
sense of nations ; Section I (2) requires the Federal Minister of Justice to certify and announce by official act
the existence in the other "nation" of a law ensuring reciprocity. a condition of application of the AUG's
procedures under Section I (I) .

Again, the details may be found in DeHart. supra n. 13 at 98 .
27

/d. at 97 .

28

Section 459A. Public Law No. 104-193. 110 Stat . ::! I 05 (1996). codified as 42 U.S .C. St!ction
659A (1996).
29

Pfund. ·'The Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention and Federal International Child Support
Enforcement." 30 r..; C Dav1.~ Law Review 647. 659 ( 1997). The statute permits these declarations to be
made "in the form of an international agreement. in connection with an international agreement or

5
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These substantive requirements will be discussed below; what is of interest here is the effort to centralize,
though on a supplemental rather than an alternative basis. the adoption of bilateral agreements: to move
from a cat's-cradle to a hub-and-spoke system of relationships. Whether this is in fact an improvement or a
bureaucratization of the first-described system, and whether it will in tum be supplanted by the possible US
ratification of a possible total revision of the Hague Convention structure. is not yet clear. 30
What is clear is that so far, as of late 1999, the Department of State had concluded only four of
these new arrangements. 31 with Ireland, the Slovak Republic, Poland, and the Canadian Province of Nova
Scotia. 32 A few other negotiations have reached an advanced state. in particular those with The
Netherlands and Norway, both of which. it should be noted, had already negotiated earlier bilateral
arrangements with at least some States.

II

The New Substantive Requirements

A more substantive issue arose with the enactment of the mentioned "Welfare Refonn" legislation.
The use of the irresistible lure of federal funding of missions that are traditionally and in a sense
constitutionally the province of the several States as a mechanism for imposing federal (usually minimum)
requirements on the latter th~t could not be imposed by direct mandate is a well-known if often
controversial feature of the United States administrative system. 33 The new welfare regime is no exception:
indeed. its "command" could not be blunter, though its choice to rest in part on criteria developed not by
Congress but in a sense by the State is unique: ''In order to satisfY ... [funding-eligibility criteria], each
State must have in effect the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, as approved by the American Bar
Association .... " 34 This raises the question, whether the criteria developed for purposes of interstate
cooperation fit or can be adapted to the different field of international cooperation; in particular. the way
and the degree to which these criteria have become the conditions of international reciprocity.

corresponding foreign declaration. or on a unilateral basis." Section 659A, supra n. 28. According to a
delegation of authority noted in the Notice cited infra n. 32. either the Legal Adviser of the Department or
the Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs is authorized to make the declaration after consultation with
the other (and, presumably, after obtaining the concurrence of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services).
30

Bruch, supra n. 2 at 614:
"Because the new approach provides benefits to every state each time the United States enters
into a bilateral agreement with a foreign country. it is far more efficient than previous
negotiations on behalf of individual states. But country-by-country negotiations nevertheless
require far more time and effort than ratifying a multinational treaty.·•

31

Burman. ''Private International Law," 32 lnternauvnal Lawyer 591. 596f ( 1998).

See xxxx Federal Register xxx (2000) . Negotiations with the Netherlands and with Nonva~ are
well-advanced and may be completed during 2000. One procedural problem. apart from the substantive
one next discussed, may be that the practice of"domesticating" even bilateral quasi-treaties may be more
fonnal when implemented at this "high" a level as compared with the bottom-up practice that the earlier
system had developed. On the other hand. even then it took the enactment of a statute (in Gennany),
whereas the Irish and Slovak arrangements have been based on declarations of satisfaction with the
reciprocity standard by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs respectively.
3
:!

33

See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I ( 1936) and. more recently. South Dakota v. Dole. 483 U.S.
203 (1987) .
34

42 U.S.C. Section 666(f).

6
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I.

The Problem

The reason why these criteria need to be discussed lies in one of the definitional subsections of
that Uniform Act. which indirectly may have reintroduced and even sharpened a requirement of reciprocity.
In order for its support orders to be honored by another State in the relatively automatic and expeditious
way the UIFSA sets out, a State has to have "enacted a law or established procedures that are substantially
35
similar to the [UIFSA] procedures .... " "State" is defined specifically to include foreign nation. 36 Taken
alone, that "substantially similar" provision does not seem to differ substantially from the original ( 1992)
UIFSA requirement that the foreign state's procedures should be substantially similar to and honor the
Act's principles.37 The problem lies buried in the technical phrasing of the mentioned definition:
UIFSA Section I 0 I( 19). 1992 Version :~• ·'State" means a state of the United States . ... The term "state··
includes an Indian tribe and includes a foreign jurisdiction that has established procedures for issuance and
enforcements of support orders which are substa~tially similar to the procedures under this Act.
39

[Commissioners'] Comment: "Subsection (19) withdraws the requirement ofreciprocity demanded by
RURESA and URESA. A state need not enact UIFSA in order for support orders issued by its tribunal to
be enforced by other states. Public policy favoring such enforcement is sufficiently strong to warrant
waiving any quid pro quo among the states. This policy extends to foreign jurisdictions, as well, which is
intended to facilitate establishment and enforcement of orders from those jurisdictions. Specificall). if a
support order from a Canadian province or Mexican state conforms to the principles of UIFSA . that order
should be honored when it crosses the border in a spirit of comity."
40

UIFSA Section 10 I( 19). 1996 Version: "State'' means a state of the United States .... The term includes:
(i)
an Indian Tribe; and
(ii)
a foreign jurisdiction that has enacted a law or established procedures for issuance and
enforcement of support orders which are substantially similar to the procedures under this
Act. the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. or the Revised Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
[Commissioners'] Commene' "Subsecti~n ( 19) withdraws the requirement of reciprocity between the
several states .. . formerly demanded by RURESA and URESA . (~ 1 ] .. . In the original promulgation of UIFSA.
the language of Subsection ( 19) was somewhat ambiguous regarding the necessity of extending reciprocity
to .. . foreign jurisdictions. By reorganizing the statutory language. the 1996 amendment clarifies that
reciprocity is not required between the several states .... Further. the additional language and reorganization
in Subsection ( 19)(ii) makes clear that in this UIFSA follows the pattern of RURESA to require that a
foreign nation must have substantially similar law or procedures to either UIFSA. RURESA . or URESA

UIFSA Section 101(19){8).
36

UIFSA Section 10 I. 9 U.L.A. (Supp. 1999).
The reference to ··procedures.. is in the statute itselt: U IFSA [ 1992] Section I0 I ( 19): the reference
to ·•principles" is in the semi-official "Commissioners· Comment." thereto.
37

18

9 U .L.A. 409 ( 1992).

39

/d. at 411.

40

9 U.L.A. 257f( 1996).

41

/d. at 259f.

42

The Comment points out that the issue will be moot as soon as all States enact UIFSA . "as
mandated [sic] by Congress in its 1996 welfare reform ." /J at 259.]

(
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(that is. reciprocity) in order for its support orders to be treated as if they had been issued by a sister state.
This is sharply different from the rule for states: amended UIFSA 1996 recognizes that in international
relations the concept of reciprocity is crucial to the acceptance of child support orders by other nations."
Because one may expect this understanding of the law to influence future efforts to achieve a
larger network of mutual unilateral arrangements~ 3 - i.e .. achieve a network of reciprocal declarations of
reciprocity- it becomes necessary to explore the substantive, jurisdictional, and choice-of-laws elements of
the new US regime. In particular, it becomes relevant to assure foreign jurisdictions that the new regime
should not inhibit their willingness to continue on this path of mutual assurance of equal treatment any
more than it should deter a State of the US from doing so. That assurance will be the more convincing the
more it is based on the unavoidable details ofthis new statutory arrangement; that, I trust, will justify the
following lengthy review.
2.

The Merits

The policies underlying the child-support provisions of the new legislation are above all those of
practicality, and only to a minor (though important) degree those of jurisdiction. As a leading participant in
the reform process has phrased them :
"The vision for child support enforcement ... is that the payment of child support should be
automatic and inescapable- 'like death or taxes.· This vision is reflected in three key elements:
(I) Access to Information- the ability to locate individuals and assets; (2) Mass Case
Processing- the capacity to work cases in volume using computers, automation. and information
Technology; and (3) Pro-Active Enforcement- the ability to take enforcement action
automatically. preferably administratively. without reliance on a complaint-driven process ...~~
Particularly important implementing elements supporting these policies. at least those important in the
international context. are the methods for assuring access to location of debtors. methods that indeed
resemble their analogues in the field oft~xation: mechanics for the centralization of the location and also
the collection functions: steps to simplify rules of civil procedure concerning the conversion of contractual
or court-ordered obligations into automatic liens rather than into separately recognized judgments in the
state of the debtor's location: mandated response times and deadlines; and availability of professional
assistance to the spouse seeking enforcement on a non-fee basis.
3.

Their Implications for Transnational Cooperation

Taken by themselves. these criteria are not in principle new. The RURESA policies alread~
reflect them. at least to the extent that the technology of that day permitted that reflection. and of course
even the 1956 New York Convention already had introduced the basic concept of administrative (rather
than judicial) leadership and public financing of the costs of the process. What is new. and important for
present purposes. is the "raising of the stakes" in terms of the modem identification and collection
procedures and the division of these specific mandates between the federal legislation (and its
implementing regulations) and the cross-referenced new Uniform Act as enacted in the several States
(UIFSA). Those domestic improvements in the process have international implications.

43

Whether the statute should have been so understood is another maner. For cogent criticism of this
understanding, see Caswell. "International Child Support- 1999." 32 Fami(v Lav.· Quarter(v 525, 537
(1999). One might add that the last sentence of the 1996 Comment reveals a confusion between unilateral
and universal rules occasionally found in the treatment of conflict-of-laws regimes.
~

Legler. "The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications ofthe 1996 Welfare Act."
30 Fami(v Law Quarter~\ · 519.538 ( 1996).

8
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This may best be demonstrated by reviewing briefly the new elements of the interstate procedures
that States expecting federal funding of their child-support enforcement offices. the so-called IV -D
Agencies, are expected to implement. The location of the non-custodial spousal debtor of course is the
45
beginning of the process, but for purposes of international cooperation the least remarkable. That. of
course, is because it is the United States, not other countries. that lacked a national Identification-Card
system. and that thus lacked an easy and effective way to help foreign applicants locate the US-resident
obligor. The new US interstate location procedures now will give the foreign nation's incoming request a
free ride on the new interstate highway. Whatever the frustrations these applicants still may experience
with locating the US resident. they will be less than those experienced in the past. The US outgoing
applications, on the other hand. pose no new challenges to foreign location procedures in this locational
regard and, thus. no new challenges in the context ofreciprocity. 46
More interesting from that perspective is the change in asset seizure. To take one example: If the
new domestic requirement that a private financial institution shall use an account-holder's Social Security
47
number as one searchable item permits the State collection agency to kill two birds with one stone- to
identifY available assets at the same time as it locates the debtor- a reciprocity requirement going this far
would create a significant problem under the laws of many foreign jurisdictions. For the receiving
jurisdiction to locate the foreign debtor by means of its own standard national identification system is one
thing; to require disclosure of financial records. whether as pendant to that process or (as would be the
case) as a separate process quite another. Fortunately, that domestic requirement is based on the one
critical distinction between interstate and international cooperation, the difference in volume.
Current California statistics suggest that incoming foreign applications might reach 500 per year.
of which approximately one-half come from Mexico: European ones typically do not. even in California.
48
exceed 100, with no one country accounting for more than 20 or so.
On the perhaps questionable
49
assumption that the outgoing requests are of the same order of magnitude, it would seem that possible
exorbitant asset-disclosure requests would not be serious enough to lead the US agency to den)' foreign
4S

Legler. supra n. 44 at 542f:
" .. .[T]he PR WORA ... significantly expands access to information ... [, providing] that the state
child support agency must have access to two important categories of records. The first category
is records of state and local government agencies. including vital statistics; state and local tax and
revenue records; records concerning real and titled personal property: records of occupational and
professional licenses: records concerning the ownership and control of corporations. partnerships.
and other business entities; ... records of motor vehicle departments; and corrections records .... The
second category ... is certain records held by private entities. including customer records of public
utilities and cable television companies and information (including assets and liabilities) .. . held by
financial institutions."

While some of this information may be useful in the search for assets. its primary purpose is to
locate the debtor. Of course. it then serves both purposes .
46

Obviously German (and other) rules on data protection and privacy would bar this kind of search
were it necessary in order to locate the debtor: but assuming that this is not a significant problem in
countries other than the US, the exorbitant nature of such a search. in those terms, should be an academic
issue only.
41

Section 3 17.

48

Private communication from the Office of the Attorney General. January 3, 2000.

49

"Questionable'' because it is generally reported that the outflow of requests from California to
Mexico exceeds the reverse: but statistics to bear this out. especially as to the magnitude of the difference.
do not seem to be available.
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applications on the ground that in this one subset the foreign state's inability to provide that disclosure
destroys the general assurance of reciprocity that remains (at least at the level of principles) a requirement.
In the context of small-number searches, the location ofthe debtor should suffice to permit an efficient
collection procedure to be initiated. Asset location is an offshoot of debtor location: only where there is a
massive caseload should it be considered an important benefit to the collection process in its own right.
The third issue raised by the new procedures, that of automatic implementation of collection
procedures, raises some different issaes but fits this analysis as well, and permits the same policy
conclusion. The single most important change here is the requirement that state Jaw permit the automatic
imposition of a lien on various types of assets, on the analogy of the typical tax lien. so This kind of shortcut procedure has raised questions of procedural due process even in the United States, though the
consensus seems to be that the debtor does not have a right to a pre-seizure hearing; 51 I assume it would
raise some questions in foreign jurisdictions as well, depending on its automaticity and on the rights of
other claimants against the support debtor. More to the point, it might well require legislative changes in
the rules of civil procedure in foreign jurisdictions.52 The basic point, however, remains the same. Since it
is the problem of a massive case volume. and its partial resolution by means of collection efficiencies such
as these. that Jed to the adoption of this procedure, it is not one which the US reasonably needs to insist on
in the international context. Thus, its possible absence there again should not lead to a rejection of the
assurance of reciprocity by the foreign state.
The underlying social problem of inadequate flow of support obligations. with its attendant burden
on the state's social-welfare norms and budgets, makes it instrumentally appropriate- puning aside
questions of fairness -that the state take over from the complainant the burden of pursuing the defaulter.
The resolution of this remaining domestic problem now has been expedited by PWRORA. which
"externalizes'' the initiative required to pursue the defaulting spouse by placing it on the state . ~; That alone
has not posed problems in the reciprocity context in the past (other jurisdictions generally also provide this
support) and should not do so in the future. It is not only the costs of the process that is at issue in the
interstate context, however. but also the power of the governmental complainant to obtain short-cut
procedures from its sister-State's agencies. The new, so-called "expedited"' procedures the US States now
are obliged to adopt in order to handle the routine situations as a condition Of obtaining federal financial
support are intended to avoid the need for· involvement of the judiciary at any stage of the typical process.
while permining more complicated judicial proceedings for the occasional more complicated situations. In
this new. procedural sense. they do go fairly deeply into new territory and indeed "'revolutionize the
collection process."' 5 ~ The following paraphrase thereof makes the point:
.. ... (O]rdering a genetic test: subpoenaing information ... : changing payees in cases of assignment:

so

Legler. supra n. ~4 at 547:
··under current law, unpaid support payments become a judgment by operation of Ia\\ . The
PR WORA builds upon this existing Jaw through two crucial changes. It provides that !tens on
the unpaid child support obligations must additionally arise by operation of Jaw. and that the
liens must be able to be imposed administratively.··

51

See Motz & Baida. "The Due Process Rights ofPostjudgment Debtors and Child Support
Obligors: · 45 Maryland Law Review 61 ( 1986) (cited in Legler. supra n. at 547 n. 147).
52

Indeed. even the question of interstate cross-border cooperation in this procedural context remains
somewhat problematical. The adoption of a federal legislative mandate that each State was obliged to give
full faith and credit to such automatic liens though unregistered in the state of the debtor's assets · location.
contained in PRWORA Section 368. suggests this concern.

Legler._supra n. 44 at 551fT.
/d. at 553 .
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.. . intercepting or seizing periodic or lump-sum payments: . .. attaching and seizing assets ofthe
obligor held in financial institutions; attaching public and private retirement funds; imposing liens;
and increasing the amount of the monthly payment to cover ... arrearages." 55
Of all of the issues discussed so far. this seems to be the only one that could give foreign
jurisdictions pause. and by doing so raise the issue of reciprocity against their own applications to US State
authorities. To the extent that US States can recharacterize even this set of powers as relevant to and thus
limited to the mass-volume situations, that danger can be avoided. 56
Finally, the financially induced incentive for States to adopt the newest Uniform Support Law
(specifically, the 1992 version ofthe Uniform Interstate Family Support Act with all amendments adopted
57
through 1997 ) brings another major change into the system; namely, the expansion of personal
jurisdiction achieved through the long-arm provisions ofUIFSA, 58 coupled with a uniform choice-of-law
standard. 59 That is sufficiently different from the substantive provisions to warrant separate discussion.
4.

New Jurisdictional Issues

The jurisdictional issues raised by the new Uniform Act of course are not novel, and should be
placed in the context of more general arguments about in-personam jurisdiction. As is well-known. the
principal expansion of the forum court's personal jurisdiction over a foreign child-support obligor rests on
some specifically identified earlier relations of that obligor to the obligee in their earlier joint domicile;
otherwise, in the interstate context, it (unfortunately) remains debatable whether a foreign obligor can
without more be haled 60 into a forum court. Extension of the grounds of personal jurisdiction by statute or
treaty may alleviate a constitutional objection, but that depends significantly on the details and the
context. 61
Older debates about jurisdictional incongruities between US and other. especially Civilian regimes
focus on the exorbitance of"tag" jurisdiction as permitted by the former and on the exorbitance of
55

/d. at 552. As Legler goes on to point out (id. at 556). each State also is obliged to permit
revocation of drivers', professional. occupational. and recreational licenses.
56

One interesting indicator of the degree offederal micromanagement of the procedures, worth at
least a footnote : One minor condition of obtain IVD funding by the states is their creation of a case-closure
system that does not close unresolved cases except under limited conditions. Part 45, Code of Federal
Regulations. Section 303 . II provides that a case may not be closed unless one of a set of criteria exist
which. as to international cases. includes:
"(6) The noncustodial parent is a citizen of. and Jives in. a foreign country. does not work for ... a
company with headquarters or offices in the United States, and has no reachable domestic income
or assets; and the State has been unable to establish reciprocity with the country."
PR WORA Section 3:! I.
UIFSA Section 20 I. 9 U.L.A. Section 50 I (1992).
UIFSA Section 303.9 U.L.A. Section 503 (1992).
60

On "haled.'' see. however. Juenger, "A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting." 28 U.C. Davis Law Rev1ew
I027 ( 1995).

61

For the argument in favor of legitimating this extension within the context of the US constitutional
limit on personal jurisdiction after the troubling decision of Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 ( 1978),
see Bruch, "Statutory Reform of Constitutional Doctrine: Fitting International Shoe to Family Law," 28
U.C. Davis Law Review 1047. 1054f( 1995).
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jurisdiction based on the domicile of the spousal/child claimant as permitted by the latter. Those
distinctions remain active and bedevil any effort at international harmonization. as the early negotiations of
a possible new Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters well demonstrate.
In that sense, UIFSA brings no significant qualitative change to the older debates and. I would
argue, presents few no problems.62 What is, as a matter of specifics. new is contained in Section 20 I.
characterized by the Conference's Official Comment thereto as containing "a broad provision for asserting
long-arm jurisdiction to give the tribunals in the home state of the supported family the maximum possible
opportunity to secure personal jurisdiction over an absent respondent .... " 63 Reasonably assuming, as Bruch
does,64 that the quoted provision would pass that constitutional muster. it remains to ask whether its use in
the international maintenance regime- a matter still to be reviewed 6s - would seem exorbitant to the
jurisdiction responding to a US submission of a maintenance order.66 That question is relevant (only) to the
extent that denial of a major ground of personal jurisdiction by that jurisdiction would in tum raise the
specter of non-reciprocity.
So far as Germany is concerned. that question might be answered by analogical recourse to the
jurisprudence interpreting Article 1(2)(1) of the Brussels Convention, which has permitted recognition of
even lump-sum judgments for child or spousal maintenance as falling without the Article's exclusion of
suits concerning "rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship" from the Convention ' s
reach.67 Extrapolating from that opening. it might be possible then to rely on the bases for personal
62

Earlier PUDRs were not held up by this difference between bases of personal jurisdiction: thus.
one should expect that only those bases that indeed are new and qualitatively different could cause any
problems.
63

Commentto Section 20 I, 9 Part IB U.L.A . 270 ( 1999). In fact, with perhaps one exception. the
text of the statute will sound less revolutionary to a Civilian audience:
"In a proceeding to establish. enforce, or modify a support order or to determine parentage, a
tribunal of this State may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual ... if:
(I) the individual is personally served .. . within this State:
(2) .....

(3) the individual resided with a child in this State:
(4) the individual resided in this State and provided prenatal expenses or support for the
child:
(5) .... :
(6) the individual t:ngaged in sexual intercourse in this State and the child rna;. have

been conceived

b~

that act of intercourse :

(7) . ... ;

(8) there is any other basis consistent with the constitution of... the United States for
the exercise of personal jurisdiction.··
Supra n.2 at 613 .

See the discussion at p. inji·a.
66

For a succinct overview of the new jurisdictional extensions in the UIFSA. as well as in the
slightly earlier federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act. 28 U.S.C. Section 17388( 1994),
but only in the interstate context. see Weintraub. "Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments and Child
Support Obligations in United States and Canadian Courts." 34 Texas International Law Journa/361. 375ff
( 1999).
6

~
See the decision of the ECJ in Van den Boogaard v. Laumen. Case C-220/95 (1997] E.C.R. 11147. interpreting the EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civ il and
Commercial Matters of27 September 1968. as amended 9 Octobt:r 1978. OJ Eur Comm. (No. 90) C
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jurisdiction that. within the circle of the Convention Member States. are acceptable in this recognition-and68
enforcement context. There are, however, some problems with that syllogism. The principal problem lies
in the well-known asymmetry of the Convention when it comes to non-Member States. The acceptance of
personal jurisdiction based on the fact that the plaintiff is a "weak party" and should not be required to seek
relief abroad is limited to the circle of Member States ofthe Brussels/Lugano Conventions. It probably
would not be available for the benefit of a third-country judgment brought to a Convention state for
69
recognition and enforcement. If. on the other hand. the previously discussed German statute were
construed as permitting recognition of, say, California support orders that were based on jurisdictional
grounds no broader than those of Brussels/Lugano, a matter of German law I am not competent to discuss,
the analogy would tit, and the problem would evaporate.
Substantively speaking, however, it has to be noted that the jurisdictional bases found in the new
US regime include some that may be difficult to sell if the sales argument were to be grounded on the
jurisdictional bases indirectly accepted in that Convention alone. Especially those bases that relate to the
establishment of paternity and conflate this with the support issue may be troublesome. given the fact that
the earlier reciprocal arrangements seem to have kept these matters separate. 70 In the end, however, I
remain of the opinion that these jurisdictional issues would not, standing alone, creates significant
roadblocks for the drive towards a larger net of bilateral enforcement arrangements. In the context of the
prior statutes and, especially, of the corpus of prior Conventions. they are not a radical breakout towards a
limitless reach of the US courts and agencies. Thus they should not trigger reciprocity concerns.
Nor is the choice-of-law provision of the new Uniform Act significantly different. or more
homeward-bound, than its predecessors. The basic rule calls for the responding tribunal to apply "the
procedural and substantive law. including the rules on choice of law, generally applicable to similar [local]
proceedings ... ; and ... [to] determine the duty of support and the amount payable in accordance with the
[local] law .... " 71 That general provision, however. is subordinate to the specific section providing for the
choice of law; specifically. that ''[t]he law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent. amount. and
duration of current payments and other obi igations of support and the payment of arrearages under the
order. 72 In addition. the longer Statute of Limitations is to be applied, whether of the issuing or responding
189/02 (July 28, 1990) on this point. This is the position in Bruch, "The 1989 Inter-American Convention
on Support Obligations," 40 American Journal of Comparative Law 817, 826f( 1992). Indeed. the drafters'
expectation that the new personal-jurisdiction provision ofUIFSA would not hinder international
enforcement was based on this "weaker-party forum" concept; see Bruch. supra n. 60 at 1055f. As she
recognizes, the analogous provisions of the Hague Enforcement Conventions of 1958 and 1973 are only
partly applicable, since they bear on the recognition and enforcement of such "weaker-pan~.:· forum orders.
but do not create that type of jurisdiction direct!~. Bruch, "The 1989 Inter-American Convention on
Support Obligations." supra at 827f.
There is an interesting parallel here to the judicially created doctrine that family-law issues.
though raised in litigation between persons who are citizens of different States. are outside the realm of
diversity jurisdiction, most recently confirmed and limited in Ankenbrandt v. Richards. 504 U.S. 689
(1992).
68

It would also be possible. of course. to base this line of reasoning on the 1973 Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to Maintenance Obligations. supra n. . See the
decision of the ECJ in Van den Boogaard v. Laumen. supra n. 66. on this point.

69

See Clermont, "Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty," 85 Cornell Law Review 89 ( 1999)
for a recent analysis and critique of this situation.
70

Weintraub, supra n. 65 at 376f, also points to this basis as a novum even in the interstate context.

71

UIFSA Section 303, 9 Part 18 U.L.A. 303 ( 1999).
UIFSA Section 604(a), id. at 357.

J3

UNPUBLISHED DRAFT- NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION OR QUOTATION

state.73 It seems to me that only this latter mandate, possibly conflicting with the hoary distinctions
74
between procedure and substance that have grown up around the prescription problem, could create a
tension for the development of further non-Conventional bilateral arrangements. This, too, is not
significant enough to shake the conclusion that, on balance, none ofthese issues rise to the level of calling
the existence of reciprocity into question.

5.

The Adequacy of Partial Reciprocity

The principal reason for this hopeful conclusion lies in the limited role these extensions of
substance and procedure actually play in the current system of creating bilateral arrangements, either by
each State or by the US. with one country at a time, especially if the arrangements are based on the PUDRs
-the parallel unilateral declarations ofreciprocity and thus of automatic enforcement. The question is not
whether Germany would accept that the described extensions fall within its previous reciprocal
arrangements with various US States, but whether, if it does not, these States then would deny reciprocity
to German requests for enforcement on the basis that Germany no longer was granting reciprocity to their
requests. 75 That question is for each State to answer, and a State would, I submit, be shooting itself and its
clients in the foot were it to throw out the baby with the bathwater and scuttle a satisfactory working
arrangement because it is not as perfect as the new interstate regime. based, as it is, on the quite different
problems of high-volume caseloads. It is true that the new jurisdictional and choice-of-laws extensions (if
the latter are such) are less driven by the mass-case phenomenon than are the substantive ones, but that
alone should not lead to a different outcome.
This argument. however. assumes a certain flexibility or discretion on the part of the competent
State authority to make such a judgment. That assumption has not been controversial in the past. when
general congruence of"principles" rather than close congruence of " laws and practices" sufficed to secure
mutual assurances of reciprocity . The uncertainty, such as it is. has been introduced by the puzzling
retrograde view of the Uniform Law Commissioners that suggests a qualitative difference between
interstate and international respect. In that situation, I would argue that both the assumption. and the
consequences of its inaccuracy, are the less problematic the more this is a matter for each individual State
to decide. Both the assumption and the consequences are different in the case of the federal takeover ofthe
bilateral arrangements. discussed earlier. It is conceivable that the federal authorities will become mired in
the problem of securing a difficult and unnecessary unanimity among their client States as a condition
precedent to continuing with what already is a slow process: although to be fair the more recent of the new
7
arrangements were made after both PROWRA and UIFSA 11 were on the books. b

73

UIFSA Section 604(b). ibid

74

See. e.g .. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws

75

Another useful approach is that of Spector. "Toward an Accommodation of Divergent
Jurisdictional Standards for the Determination of Maintenance Obligations in Private International Law ...
(unpublished. 1999). By analogy to the practice under the Child Custody and Abduction Conventions. he
proposes that the receiving jurisdiction should not look at the basis for personal jurisdiction claimed by the
sending jurisdiction when it issued its order. but at whether on the facts of the underlying documentation
the former could have asserted personal jurisdiction, in the reverse situation. on a ground available under its
law. This would be especially useful in reducing foreign objections to the US exercise of"tag" jurisdiction.
Thus, if the jurisdictional bases of Section 20 I (3). (4), and perhaps even (6). would have been specifically
available to the receiving jurisdiction. the fact that jurisdiction in fact was based on subsection (I) should
be irrelevant.
6

As the referenced Federal Register Notice. supra n. 32. indicates. the Ireland, Slovak Republic.
Nova Scotia and Poland Declarations of Reciprocit) were made after September I0. 1997. By the same
token. however. it should be noted that the Notice provides that:
;
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The interesting question, of course. is whether moving these issues and discussions to a new
diplomatic conference that seeks to create a revise Maintenance Convention is a way to cut the federal
knot. or is a way of rejecting an adequate solution in favor of a bener but unreachable one. The
Congressional adoption- in part directly in PROWRA. in part by reference through UIFSA- of the
described substantive. procedural. and jurisdictional extensions as conditions to be met in future reciprocal
arrangements does not augur well for the first conclusion. It is not a constitutional issue: that is. a treaty
would override the prior federal as well as state statutory regimes. It is, however. a significant issue of
political authority, nerve, and credibility; an issue that, in particular, pits two rival views of states' rights
against each other. It has been close to impossible in the past, and remains difficult to this day. for the US
Executive Branch to find support from the Legislative Branch for treaty "intrusion" into subjects
historically left to the States, constitutional as that "intrusion" may be.
If the Executive Branch is fated to strive for the full international implementation of the
new and therefore by definition more perfect version of the interstate arrangement, it may well be trapped
in the paradoxical situation of denying some States their freedom to opt for the less perfect but more
feasible arrangement. Since for US States it is Mexico and to a lesser extent Canada that provide the
substantial plurality (in some cases the majority) of international issues, and since implementation
procedures are frequently revisited and improved by their authorities at the working level. the lessons
learned from those experiences may be more effective as heuristic tools for more general improvement than
a decade of diplomatic discussions focused on more formal issues. Treaties are a blunt tool for this kind of
work.

"[t]hese procedures must be in substantial conformity with mandatory elements set out in the
statute: procedures for the establishment of paternity and support orders for children and
custodial parents: a system for the enforcement of orders. including procedures for the collection
and distribution of payments under such orders; providing administrative and legal services
without cost to the U.S . applicant: and the designation of an agency to serve as a central
authority.·•
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